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Abstract  
 
A  total  of  80  currency  boards  have  come  into  existence  at  some  point  since  the  mid-19th 
century, but to date only about 15 of them still exist, among which is the CFA franc monetary 
zone. The future sustainability of the CFA franc zone, to which the CEMAC CFA franc belongs, 
is increasingly questioned in the light of increasing asymmetries in exposure to external shocks, 
differential speeds of adjustment of the real exchange rate following shocks, differential impacts 
in economic fundamentals, and low levels of intra-regional trade and financial flows between 
CEMAC and WAEMU. For the CEMAC bloc of countries in particular, the future sustainability of 
the fixed exchange regime depends crucially on continued oil exports, which currently represent 
about 90percent of export revenues and 40 percent of GDP. Should oil reserves deplete in the 
near future or oil prices decline significantly, a substantial source of foreign reserves would be 
lost,  thereby  exposing  the  regime  to  collapse.  Even  without  resource  depletion,  continued 
volatility in global financial markets is increasing the risks of collapse of the fixed exchange 
regime  as  oil  and  commodity  price  swings  ignite  currency  speculation  as  well  as  render 
reserves much more volatile. Against this backdrop, the present study examines the stakes 
facing the CEMAC CFA franc, discusses the exit options from the currency board and makes 
recommendations towards a sustainable monetary policy framework for CEMAC countries going 
forward. The analysis points to the imperative of pursuing a full monetary union with a single 
CEMAC franc pegged to the U.S. dollar and further suggest that, like the experience of the 
eurozone, the CEMAC monetary arrangement can be best implemented only by complying with 
the principle of political union. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since 1946, the African Financial Community (known by its French acronym, CFA) franc zone 
has existed as the monetary arrangement between France and two African regional bodies, 
CEMAC (Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa) and WAEMU (Economic and 
Monetary  Community  of  West  Africa).  CEMAC  is  comprised  of  six  countries—Cameroon, 
Gabon, the Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Chad—and 
WAEMU is comprised of eight countries—Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Togo, 
Mali, Niger and Guinea-Bissau. Comoros became the fifteenth member of the CFA franc zone 
in1981, but has since maintained its own independent Comorian franc. 
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The CFA franc currency board arrangement
1 (CBA) thus links three currencies to the euro—the 
two CFA francs issued separately by the BEAC (Bank of the Central African States or Banque 
des États de l’Afrique Centrale), the central bank of CEMAC; the BCEAO (Central Bank of the 
West African States or Banque Centrale des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest), the central bank of 
WAEMU; and the Comorian franc
2. By promising to convert all CFA franc notes issued by the 
CEMAC and WAEMU central banks into the euro at a fixed rate, the French treasury, through 
an operations account, guarantees the peg of the CFA francs to the euro. In return for the 
“unlimited” lines of credit
3  offered by the French treasury, two important institutional safeguards 
exist. First, at least 20 percent of sight liabilities of each central bank must be covered by foreign 
exchange reserves. Second, at least 50 percent of foreign exchange r eserves of each member 
country must be held in the operations account and countries that draw on the overdraft facilities 
are subject to increasing interest rate penalties. 
While CEMAC’s total population of 36.7 million people (in 2010) makes it roughly the 
same size as Poland, its combined GDP of $70.9 billion compares to that of Iraq. With the 
exception of Cameroon, each CEMAC country has a dominant export commodity accounting for 
over 80 percent of total export revenues. CEMAC countries, with the exception of the diamond-
exporting Central African Republic, are net oil exporters, and their economic development is 
dominated  by  developments  in  the  oil  market.  Although  CEMAC’s  trade  with  the  eurozone 
economies continues to be important, over the last two decades CEMAC countries have been 
trading increasingly more with China and the U.S. As Figure 1 suggests, the share of CEMAC’s 
exports and imports to eurozone economies has declined from 0.64 percent and 0.57 percent, 
respectively, of world trade in 1990 to 0.26 percent and 0.41 percent of world trade in 2011. 
Interestingly, over the same period, the share of CEMAC’s exports to the U.S. and China, as a 
percentage of world trade, have grown by a factor of two and thirty, respectively. 
 
                                                 
1 In a strict sense, the use of the term currency board in describing the CFA franc zone is a misnomer 
given that some of the key characteristics of a currency board, notably, full reserve coverage of base 
money are not mandated. However, the broader meaning of the term would include the so-called “classic” 
currency boards which are monetary arrangements linking former colonial empires to the Metropolitan 
economy. This is the sense in which the term is employed in this paper. 
2 The BEAC issues the Franc de la Coop￩ration Financi￨re Africaine (CFA) while the BCEAO issues the 
Franc de la Communaut￩ Financi￨re de l’Afrique (CFA). Since January 1, 1999, both CFA francs are fixed 
to the euro (previously French franc) at the same rate, 655.957 per euro. The Comorian franc used to be 
pegged at the same rate as the two CFA francs until the January 11, 1994 devaluation which saw different 
rates  of  devaluation  against  the  French  franc  of  50  percent  and  33  percent  for  the  CFA  francs  and 
Comorian francs respectively (Banque de France, 2010). 
3  These convertibility guarantees offered by the French treasury means in principle that CFA franc 
countries need not hold any reserves to back their currency. Thus, the partial reserve requirement could be 
thought of as a means of instilling discipline in the monetary authorities.  
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Figure 1. Trends in CEMAC’s external trade 
 
The  graphs  presented  in  Figures  2-7  summarize  overall  economic  activity  and 
macroeconomic performance in CEMAC countries over the past decade. As Figure 2 reveals, 
the trend in CEMAC’s overall GDP growth has been largely consistent with the trend in its real 
non-oil GDP growth, although there is some similarity in co-movements of real oil GDP growth. 
It can also be observed that after declining from about 12 percent in 2007, real non-oil GDP 
growth has since stagnated at about 6 percent annually. It is also equally important to note that 
CEMAC’s non-oil GDP growth performance lags behind that of oil-exporting sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA)  economies  as  in  Figure  3.  At  this  point,  CEMAC  policymakers  face  two  important 
challenges: one, breaking away from the current stagnating growth performance of non-oil GDP 
and, two, effectively utilizing oil GDP growth to leverage overall GDP growth. Figure 4 suggests 
that although real per capita GDP growth performance in CEMAC has been relatively superior 
to that in the WAEMU region during the past decade, CEMAC’s performance has lagged behind 
that of oil-exporting SSA and SSA economies without conventional exchange rate pegs. 
Figure  5  suggest  that,  although  still  markedly  appreciated,  CEMAC’s  real  effective 
exchange rate has been declining since 2009 and remains far below that of oil-exporting SSA 
economies.  During  the  preceding  decade,  average  consumer  price  inflation  has  been 
comparatively  lower  in  CEMAC  zone  than  in  other  oil-exporting  SSA  countries  and  SSA 
countries without conventional exchange rate pegs, as Figure 6 suggests. Also, in comparison 
with  other  oil-exporting  SSA  and  SSA  countries  without  conventional  exchange  rate  pegs, 
CEMAC  zone’s  overall  fiscal  balance  over  the  past  decade  has  been  more  impressive,  as 
suggested by Figure 7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AS % SHARE OF WORLD TRADE 
1990  2011  1990  2011 
0.005  0.15  0.008  0.12 
0.15  0.32  0.04  0.07 
0.67  0.27  0.64  0.46 
0.64  0.26  0.57  0.41 
GROWTH IN AGGREGATE VALUE (%) 
CEMAC TRADE WITH CHINA 
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CEMAC TRADE WITH EUROPEAN UNION 
CEMAC TRADE WITH EUROZONE 
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IMPORTS INTO  
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12901%  11510% 
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258%  245% 
250%  261% 
              Source: Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS). Data covers all CEMAC countries with the exception  
of the Central African Republic  
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Figure 2. Trends in CEMAC’s real GDP growth performance (%) 
Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook complimented by BEAC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Comparative assessment of CEMAC’s real non-oil GDP growth (%) 
Source: IMF, April 2012 Regional Economic Outlook 
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Figure 4. Comparative assessment of CEMAC’s real per capita GDP growth (%) 
Source: IMF, April 2012 Regional Economic Outlook 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Comparative assessment of CEMAC’s real effective exchange rate 
(Annual average, index 2000=100) 
Source: IMF, April 2012 Regional Economic Outlook 
 
 
Figure 6. Comparative assessment of CEMAC’s consumer inflation 
(Annual average % change) 
Source: IMF, April 2012 Regional Economic Outlook 
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Figure 7. Comparative assessment of CEMAC’s overall fiscal balance 
(% of GDP) 
Source: IMF, April 2012 Regional Economic Outlook 
 
 
Figure 8. Comparative assessment of CEMAC’s external current account 
(Excluding grants, % of GDP) 
Source: IMF, April 2012 Regional Economic Outlook 
 
 
Figure 9. Comparative assessment of CEMAC’s reserve coverage 
(Months of import of goods & services) 
Source: IMF, April 2012 Regional Economic Outlook 
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Figures  8  and  9  suggest  that  CEMAC’s  current  account  and  reserve  positions  are 
broadly consistent with external stability, although CEMAC’s external position remains far less 
stable than that of other oil-exporting SSA economies. It is worth emphasizing that the observed 
positive trends in CEMAC’s macroeconomic indicators owe largely to positive developments in 
the oil market where prices have quadrupled between 1994 and 2006, leading to significant 
increases in reserves, export and fiscal revenues. At the same time, the negative impact of the 
2008-2009 global recession is evident in CEMAC’s macroeconomic indicators. 
Obviously,  these  aggregate  data  mask  significant  disparities  among  CEMAC’s  individual 
countries  and,  in  spite  of  relatively  sound  macroeconomic  indicators,  important  challenges 
facing the Central African sub-region as a whole remain. 
 
2. Looking Ahead: A Risk Analysis for the CEMAC CFA Franc 
 
The CEMAC CFA franc monetary regime has both negative and positive consequences for its 
economies.  On  the  upside,  the  regime  has  benefited  CEMAC  states  by  promoting 
macroeconomic stability through lower inflation. In addition, as a result of enhanced credibility of 
the fixed regime brought about by the French convertibility guarantees, the regime has also 
lowered  black  market  exchange  premium.  On  the  downside,  the  fixed  regime  has  probably 
contributed  to  the  lack  of  competitiveness  of  CEMAC  economies,  although  the  relative 
importance  of  this  constrain  to  structural  factors  remains  an  empirical  issue.  Against  this 
backdrop,  a  number  of  important  challenges  currently  face  monetary  policymakers  in  the 
CEMAC zone, including: 
2.1. Countries that operate a fixed exchange regime make an implicit commitment to 
exchange unlimited amounts of domestic currency for the reference foreign currency at a fixed 
rate. Therefore, it is important for such countries to maintain a significant portion of their export 
earnings in foreign currency, which economists call reserves. In CEMAC, reserve accumulation, 
which is important to defending the fixed exchange regime, is largely driven by oil exports. Oil 
accounts  for  90  percent  of  CEMAC’s  exports  and  about  40  percent  of  GDP,  implying  that 
reserve accumulation will continue to be largely driven by oil exports (IMF, 2011). Therefore, the 
depletion of the resource in the somewhat-near future would undermine a significant source of 
foreign exchange reserves and consequently endanger the ability of the monetary authorities to 
exchange the local currency for foreign currency. Although CEMAC oil producers have different 
oil resource endowments and are at different stages of the oil production cycle, oil deposits are 
expected to be largely depleted for most of CEMAC states in a decade or so
4  (Gulde and 
Tsangarides, 2008, p.114). While tools such as intervention in forwards and derivative markets, 
monetary tightening and capital controls could be used in defending a fixed exchange regime 
when  reserves  deplete,  these  options  are  either  cost -ineffective  or  simply  unavailable  to 
CEMAC economies. Figure 10 suggests that, over the past decade, CEMAC zone aggregate oil 
production  has  witnessed  a  long -term  increase,  driven  largely  by  new  oil  discoveries  in 
Equatorial Guinea and Chad. For the rest of the countries —notably Cameroon and Gabon, the 
two leading economies in CEMAC—the trend in oil production has been broadly consistent with 
the prediction of a saturating petroleum production cycle as observed in stagnating petroleum 
output over the last decade, despite sustained pressure on oil prices
5.  Currently, although the 
IMF (2011) projects that the CEMAC CFA franc fixed exchange regime is adequately secure 
with a gross international reserve position of about 4.5 months of total imports and 100percent 
of broad money, questions about the source of  future reserves remain.  Thus, unless new oil 
discoveries and subsequent exploitation take place now, the future of the fixed exchange 
regime is at stake. 
                                                 
4 Thanks to new technologies that have expanded production from mature fields, the oil horizon has been 
extended for some CEMAC states, notably, Gabon. However, in the absence of new discoveries of oil 
deposits, this development only extends the time horizon of the risk but does not eliminate it. 
5  For instance, oil production in Cameroon commenced in 1976 and peaked in 1985 but has been 
declining since the mid 1990s.  
 
 
J.A. Agbor / Eurasian Journal of Economics and Finance, 1(1), 2013, 1-17 
 
 
 
8 
 
2.2. Even without resource exhaustion, continued volatility in global financial markets is 
inducing increased currency fluctuations, which means increased volatility in oil and commodity 
prices.  Increased  volatility  in  commodity  prices  translates  into  increased  volatility  in  export 
revenues for CEMAC countries. Increased export revenue volatility implies increased volatility in 
CEMAC  foreign  reserves,  which  raises  the  risks  of  currency  speculation  and  eventually  a 
currency crisis.  
 
 
Figure 10. Trends in CEMAC’s petroleum production (in million tons) 
Source: BEAC courtesy national governments & IMF 
 
Gulde and Tsangarides (2008) estimate that a one standard deviation fall in the price of 
oil in 2006 leads to a loss in reserves in the CEMAC zone of about two months of import cover. 
Thus, increased global financial market volatility would require CEMAC countries to maintain 
increasingly higher reserve coverage. Besides the opportunity cost of holding a higher stock of 
foreign  reserve  in  terms  of  lost  investment  and  growth,  the  fact  that  a  significant  source  of 
reserves would continue to come from oil exports is worrisome in the context of depleting oil 
deposits. 
2.3. With the imminent coming into force of the fiscal compact in the eurozone, France 
is increasingly subjected to limits on its deficits and, thus, cannot be counted upon to continue 
providing unlimited lines of credit to buffer the CFA franc currency board, even if it wanted to do 
so. The fact that the French treasury would not be able to continue injecting unlimited amounts 
of liquidity without further consequences casts doubts on the credibility of the CFA franc fixed 
regime going forward. Future constraints on French convertibility guarantees imply that CEMAC 
countries would need to shoulder increasingly higher levels of foreign reserves by themselves. 
The empirical evidence suggests that, without the French convertibility guarantee, CEMAC’s 
reserves in 2005 would have had to cover 5.8 months of imports instead of 3.8 (Gulde and 
Tsangarides, 2008, p.116). 
As mentioned above, the main problems with the requirement of increasingly higher 
future reserve levels are that reserve accumulation  continues to be largely supported by  oil 
exports, and oil bases are fast depleting. Higher reserves cover also has an opportunity cost in 
terms of lost investment and growth. The empirical evidence suggests that during 1999-2004, 
the total cost of holding reserves amounts, on average, to 0.5 percent and 1.6 percent of annual 
GDP in CEMAC and WAEMU respectively. Thus, without the French convertibility guarantee, 
overall  CEMAC  GDP  growth  would  fall  by  0.5  percent  annually  due  to  the  higher  level  of 
required reserves (Gulde and Tsangarides, 2008). 
2.4. Another potential source of vulnerability for the CEMAC CFA franc is the increasing 
evidence  of  the  “Dutch  disease”  exemplified  by  the  declining  terms  of  trade  and  export 
profitability of CEMAC’s non-oil exports since 2000, in spite of the fact that overall oil export 
profitability has been increasing. According to Gulde and Tsangarides (2008), both the export-
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price wage and the export-price index to tertiary GDP deflator (used in capturing overall export 
profitability) for CEMAC countries have been improving from 1993 to 2006
6,  at the same time 
that non-oil export-price wage and non-oil export-price index have been declining. The analysis 
suggests another important source of vulnerability for the fixed exchange regime considering 
that the profitability of the non -oil export sector is central to efforts aimed at diversifying the 
export resource base. A diversified export resource base helps in mitigating potential adverse 
effects of falling oil prices and or saturating oil production
7.  
Cognizant of the above-mentioned risks, CEMAC policymakers, through advice from the 
IMF and World Bank, have been implementing a number of policies to mitigate these risks. 
Such policies include anchoring fiscal policies of oil-producing countries in sustainable medium-
term frameworks in order to take into account the expected depletion of oil revenues. They have 
also  implemented  structural  policies  aimed  at  spurring  economic  diversification,  improving 
competitiveness and productivity through the creation of a supportive business environment, 
and lowering factor costs. In spite of these policy initiatives, the CEMAC fixed exchange 
regime—embedded in an underdeveloped financial market—remains highly vulnerable in the 
face of increased capital mobility. Furthermore, it is questionable whether the fixed regime will 
continue  to  enhance  macroeconomic  and  financial  stability  when  shocks  are  of  a  foreign 
nominal nature and no longer of a domestic monetary origin. 
 
3. Should the Present Currency Board Arrangement (CBA) Collapse, what are the 
Alternative Exit Options for CEMAC Countries? 
 
Four  options,  listed  below,  exist  for  CEMAC  countries  should  they  choose  to  exit  from  the 
current currency board regime. 
 
3.1. Moving to a Simple Peg 
 
Both a simple peg and a currency board are types of fixed exchange regimes, but a currency 
board is a hard form of a fixed exchange regime. In general, a simple peg holds two advantages 
over a currency board. First, by imposing only partial reserve coverage of domestic monetary 
liabilities, a simple peg lowers the opportunity cost of holding reserves, which might translate 
into higher investment and growth. Second, because the central bank is not strictly limited by 
foreign reserves in money creation, a simple peg offers room, at least in the short run, for the 
use of monetary policy tools in smoothing excessive swings in domestic interest rates, (Ghosh 
et al. 2000). Along the same lines, in the event of a systemic banking crisis, a simple peg allows 
for a limited role of the central bank’s lender of last resort function. Thus, from a CEMAC zone 
perspective, a simple peg would undermine the need for higher reserve coverage in the future 
while also creating more space for the conduct of monetary policy.  
Notwithstanding, the move from a CBA to a simple peg implies a substantial loss  in 
monetary  policy  credibility.  This  loss  occurs  because  moving  to  a  simple  peg  implies 
abandoning the formal link between domestic money creation and reserves. So far, the French 
convertibility guarantees has achieved two things: enforced credibility in the fixed regime and 
reduced the need for full reserve coverage of domestic monetary liabilities that is mandated in a 
traditional CBA. Hence, in terms of coverage of domestic monetary liabilities, CEMAC countries 
may witness little or no change in switching to a simple peg, but will experience substantial loss 
in policy credibility as the probability of a successful attack on the currency is now higher. Under 
the current CFA franc arrangement, the abuse of discretion is contained by the 20 percent rule 
requiring that CEMAC’s central bank, the BEAC, extend credit to member states’ governments 
only to a maximum of 20 percent of fiscal revenues of the previous year. Moving to a simple peg 
                                                 
6 The latest data on these variables could not be obtained by the time of this publication but it is unlikely 
that the observed trend has reversed significantly. 
7 While suitable financial instruments can be effectively used in hedging against fluctuations in oil revenues 
when oil prices fall, this option is largely unavailable to CEMAC economies as a result of the undeveloped 
nature of their financial systems.  
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would imply loosening this tight constraint on policymakers. Finally, moving to a simple peg 
implies replacing the foreign nominal anchor of monetary policy with a domestic nominal anchor 
in the sense that convertibility of the currency which was previously guaranteed by a foreign 
monetary  authority  (the  French  treasury  in  this  case)  will  now  be  guaranteed  by  domestic 
monetary authorities.  
Given  the  widespread  experience  of  debt  monetization  by  developing  countries, 
especially those in sub-Saharan Africa, a move to a simple peg constitutes a move towards a 
less credible monetary policy framework. It’s a small wonder why many of the countries in sub-
Saharan Africa (mostly former colonial empires of Portugal and England) that abandoned the 
CBA in favor of a simple peg at the eve of independence ended up worse-off than their peers 
that remained in the CBA
8. To the extent that CEMAC’s public domestic financing will continue 
to be dominated by debt monetization
9, one can expect a similar fate for CEMAC economies 
should they adopt simple pegs as an alternative to the present regime. 
 
3.2. Floating 
 
Many small, open economies despise floating their exchange regimes for two reasons. First, 
they  lack  the  necessary  institutional  structures  to  support  a  floating  regime,  notably,  a  truly 
independent  central  bank  with  an  explicit  mandate  of  price  stability.  Second,  they  lack  the 
requisite  human  capital  with  a  full  understanding  of  the  monetary  transmission  mechanism, 
(Mishkin, 2007). Indeed, there are many difficult choices to make once one decides to pursue a 
floating exchange regime, for example, should we float against a single currency or against a 
basket of currencies? Which nominal anchor for monetary policy should we use: the exchange 
rate, the money supply (and in turn, which monetary aggregate?), the inflation rate, the price 
level or nominal GDP? These are all tough questions that require rigorous empirical research to 
answer.  Though  certainly  a  premature  option  for  CEMAC  states  to  implement  today,  going 
forward the CEMAC states may find the option of floating to be increasingly relevant as they 
further integrate into the world economy and desire greater scope in monetary policymaking. 
Floating  the  CFA  franc  is  also  appealing  to  the  extent  that  flexibility  to  use  exchange  rate 
adjustments  can  be  particularly  important  to  CEMAC  economies  with  undiversified  export 
structures  and  increasing  susceptibility  to  real  shocks.  Generally,  economies  with  such 
characteristics  need  to  carefully  weigh  the  decision  to  give  up  active  use  of  monetary  and 
exchange  rate  policies  implied  in  pegged  regimes.  If  floating  is  the  preferred  option,  the 
question then becomes: Which is more beneficial, floating against a single currency or floating 
against  a  basket  of  international  currencies?  Depending  on  the  degree  of  flexibility  desired, 
floating against a basket of international currencies might appear a first-best option. 
 
3.3. Dollarization 
 
The option to dollarize means that CEMAC zone monetary authorities would have to completely 
give up on the task of monetary and exchange rate policies and simply adopt monetary policy 
from abroad. The question then becomes which country’s monetary policy to adopt? Is it that of 
the U.S., Japan, eurozone, South Africa or Nigeria? Policymakers should take three important 
ideas into account when choosing an adopted currency. First, monetary policy in the adopted 
currency  country  should  be  in  the  hands  of  independent  and  conservative  central  bankers. 
Second,  the  monetary  policy  choices  of  the  foreign  central  bank  should  be  consistent  with 
CEMAC  states’  own  domestic  monetary  options.  In  other  words,  there  should  be  a  strong 
correlation between shocks to output in CEMAC states and the foreign economy. Third, CEMAC 
                                                 
8 It is claimed that the decision by most former SSA colonial empires to exit the CBA with their colonial 
masters was motivated by political rather than economic reasons and in the two decades following their 
exit, these countries generally experienced unusually high black market exchange premiums and weak 
economic activity. Notable examples were Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Conakry, Nigeria and Tanzania 
(Fielding, 2005). 
9 The informal sector largely dominates the economies of CEMAC, which constrains government financing 
sources other than through debt monetization.  
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should choose an economy in which CEMAC is already highly integrated in terms of trade and 
financial flows. In spite of the potential benefits of dollarizing their economies, notably in terms 
of reduced transaction costs and a lower cost of foreign borrowing, experience suggests that 
dollarization  is  usually  considered  only  as  a  last  resort  by  economies  in  severe  economic 
distress. Issues of pride in own national currency often overrule this option. 
 
3.4. Full Monetary Union 
 
A crucial factor in deciding which monetary regime to pursue is whether a country wants to forgo 
the  active  use  of  monetary  and  exchange  rate  policies.  With  dollarization  and  moving  to  a 
monetary  union,  a  country  surrenders  these  two  crucial  tools  of  macroeconomic  policy.  As 
Schelling (1984) argues, there are strong intellectual grounds to abandon these tools, especially 
if domestic monetary authorities cannot be trusted to conduct monetary policy in a sensible way. 
Indeed, the experiences of most developing countries suggest that a multilateral framework for 
the  conduct  of  monetary  policy  that  further  constrains  the  discretion  of  national  monetary 
authorities is critical to imposing sound discipline on monetary policy.  
There are currently two prospects for a full monetary union as a multilateral framework 
for  the  conduct  of  monetary  policy  that  CEMAC  states  can  pursue.  The  first  involves  only 
CEMAC states and the other involves both CEMAC and WAEMU countries within the broader 
CFA  franc  zone.  The  option  of  a  full  monetary  union  between  CEMAC  and  WAEMU  zone 
countries is problematic in the light of increasing asymmetries in exposure to external shocks, 
differential  speeds  of  adjustment  of  the  real  exchange  rate  following  shocks,  important 
differences in the marginal impacts of economic fundamentals, and the generally low levels of 
intra-regional trade and financial flows between CEMAC and WAEMU
10.   
However, based on their progress in meeting certain criteria stipulated by traditional 
optimum currency area (OCA) theory, a full monetary union could well be implemented within 
the CEMAC bloc of countries. Traditional OCA theory
11 suggests that countries desiring to form 
a monetary union must a priori meet a number of convergence criteria, such as macroeconomic 
and economic convergence, in addition to having synchronous business cycles (or similarities in 
production structures). The macroeconomic convergence criteria towards monetary union set by 
CEMAC member states include: annual inflation rates at below 3 percent, a positive fiscal 
balance
12, an annual level of public debt to GDP of less than 70 percent and a non -positive net 
change in government arrears (both exte rnal and internal). Figure 11 suggests that CEMAC 
states are broadly complying with the macroeconomic convergence criteria —only  Equatorial 
Guinea currently violates more than one of the four convergence criterion. 
 
                                                 
10  For  a  full  discussion  of  the  intricacies  of  having  a  monetary  union  between  CEMAC  and WAEMU 
countries, see Gulde and Tsangarides (2008). 
11 The alternative endogenous OCA theory suggests that the OCA criterion may be satisfied ex -post even 
if countries do not meet them a prioiri, because a monetary union is itself capable of catalyzing the process 
of trade integration across countries (Corsetti and Paolo, 2002). For earlier contributions to the discussion 
on OCA theory see Mundell (1961) and Kenen (1969). 
12 Overall budget balance, excluding grants and foreign-financed investment.  
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Figure 11. Evidence of macroeconomic convergence in CEMAC 
 
The  ongoing  eurozone  crisis  has  taught  us  that  macroeconomic  and  economic 
convergence,  taking  place  both  a  priori  and  a  posteriori,  are  crucial  to  having  a  successful 
monetary union, (Masson, 2007). Economic convergence simply means that productivity levels, 
and thus competitiveness, in member state economies are converging over time. If economic 
convergence  is  not  maintained  while  in  a  monetary  union,  some  states  might  experience 
persistent current account imbalances that would necessitate an exchange rate adjustment to 
remedy,  hence  violating  the  basic  rule  requiring  that  the  exchange  rates  amongst  member 
states  remain  fixed  at  all  times.  Two  main  indicators  of  economic  convergence  will  be 
considered here – convergence in speeds of adjustment of member states’ real exchange rates 
following significant misalignment from respective long-run equilibriums and convergence in per 
capita income levels. 
With  respect  to  the  speed  of  adjustment  of  member  states’  real  exchange  rate, 
significant sluggishness has been reported in CEMAC countries, notably due to the high degree 
of labor immobility across the region and the absence of fiscal centralization in CEMAC zone
13. 
Though efforts at standardizing and eventually centralizing member states’ budgetary spending 
processes in CEMAC have been remarkably slow, it would be less of a hassle for CEMAC 
states to form a common pool of foreign reserves, given their successful experience with the 
operations account. Therefore the observed sluggishness in the adjustment of CEMAC’s real 
exchange rate need not significantly jeopardize the workings of a monetary union in CEMAC as 
long as member states continue to pursue the reforms currently in place.  
With respect to convergence in real per capita income levels, Figure 12 presents the trend in 
percentage differences of CEMAC member states' real per capita GDP levels relative to the 
overall CEMAC average in an attempt at assessing the extent to which states are catching up or 
converging in per capita income terms. 
 
                                                 
13 Gulde & Tsangarides (2008) have found that the speed of adjustment in CEMAC’s real exchange rate is 
twice as slow than that of WAEMU. 
Total Number of 
Convergence Criteria 
Violations by CEMAC 
States 4 8 9 6 5 5
Cameroon 0 1 2 1 0 0
Central African Republic 2 3 2 1 2 1
Chad 0 1 2 1 0 0
Congo, Republic of 1 1 1 1 1 1
Equatorial Guinea 0 1 2 2 2 2
Gabon 1 1 0 0 0 1
Source: IMF, April 2012 Regional Economic Outlook 
2011 Est. 2012 Est. 2007 2008 2009 2010 
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Figure 12. Percent difference in real per capita income levels relative to CEMAC average 
Source: Author's computations based on World Bank/African Development Indicators data 
 
Allowing for errors of precision in calculating purchasing power parity, gaps in income 
differentials of less than 5 percent are typically considered as insignificant, (Giannone et al. 
2009). As Figure 12 shows, with the exception of two countries (Equatorial Guinea and Gabon), 
the rest of CEMAC economies have been on a path of divergence in per capita income terms. 
However,  these  income  differentials  shouldn't  discourage  progress  towards  full  monetary 
integration  in  CEMAC  considering  that  the  income  differentials  of  eurozone  peripheral 
economies before and after 1999 were far larger in magnitude than those of CEMAC states (see 
Giannone et al. 2009).  
 
 
Figure 13. Movements in CEMAC States net barter terms of trade (2000=100) 
Source: Author's Construction from World Bank/African Development Indicators 
 
With respect to the similarities in production structures criteria, so far the Central Africa 
Republic  (CAR)  is  the  only  CEMAC  country  with  a  slightly  divergent  production  structure. 
However, given CAR’s rich resource endowment in diamonds, it is unlikely that it does run into a 
-35 
-30 
-25 
-20 
-15 
-10 
-5 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
1
9
6
0
 
1
9
6
2
 
1
9
6
4
 
1
9
6
6
 
1
9
6
8
 
1
9
7
0
 
1
9
7
2
 
1
9
7
4
 
1
9
7
6
 
1
9
7
8
 
1
9
8
0
 
1
9
8
2
 
1
9
8
4
 
1
9
8
6
 
1
9
8
8
 
1
9
9
0
 
1
9
9
2
 
1
9
9
4
 
1
9
9
6
 
1
9
9
8
 
2
0
0
0
 
2
0
0
2
 
2
0
0
4
 
2
0
0
6
 
2
0
0
8
 
2
0
1
0
 
GNQ 
CAF 
TCD 
COG 
GAB 
CMR 
0 
50 
100 
150 
200 
250 
GNQ 
COG 
GAB 
TCD 
CMR 
CAF  
 
 
J.A. Agbor / Eurasian Journal of Economics and Finance, 1(1), 2013, 1-17 
 
 
 
14 
 
deep recession following oil price spikes that benefit the rest of CEMAC states
14. To the extent 
that  asymmetric  movements  in  member  sta tes’  net  barter  terms  of  trade
15  (NBTT)  are 
suggestive of differences in countries’ exposure to external conditions (McCarthy, 2012), Figure 
13,  revealing  a  strong  correlation  in  movements  of CEMAC  members’  respective  net  barter 
terms  of  trade  over  time,  suggest  that  these  states  have  broadly  manifested  symmetric 
responses to external shocks. 
 
 
Figure 14. Differences in per capita GDP growth rates relative to CEMAC averages 
Source: Author's computations based on World Bank/African Development Indicators data 
 
 
Figure 15. Cross-country growth dispersion of CEMAC zone economies 
Source: Author's construction based on World Bank/African Development Indicators data 
                                                 
14 Indeed, the pursuit of financial modernization is imperative in CEMAC zone as it would allow the use of 
financial instruments in hedging against commodity price and revenue fluctuations that may hurt some of 
their economies. 
15 The net barter terms of trade is defined as the percentage ratio of export unit value indexes to the import 
unit value indexes, measured relative to a base year. It is therefore the export price index divided by the 
import price index and multiplied by 100. 
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Figure 14 presents the trends in variation of CEMAC states' real per capita GDP growth 
relative to the CEMAC growth average, in an attempt at assessing the extent of heterogeneity in 
CEMAC states' business cycles over time. Declining growth variations relative to the CEMAC 
average would suggest decreasing heterogeneity in member states business cycles, and by 
implication, a greater chance of success with a common monetary and exchange rate policy. 
With the exception of the huge variation in Equatorial Guinea's growth relative to the CEMAC 
average,  the  evidence  in  Figure  14  is  broadly  consistent  with  increasingly  synchronized 
business cycles in CEMAC zone.  Figure 15 further confirms that the pattern of overall CEMAC 
business cycle heterogeneity has been declining over time. 
The  above  analysis  points  to  the  satisfactory  attainment  of  key  macroeconomic 
convergence  criteria  by  CEMAC  states.  Yet  CEMAC  states  are  lagging  behind  in  terms  of 
meeting  economic  convergence  criteria.  Drawing  further  from  the  eurozone  experience,  we 
learn that meeting economic convergence, both a priori and a posteriori, is crucial to having a 
successful  monetary  union.  Given  the  context  of  economic  divergence  in  CEMAC  and 
considering that member states of a monetary union are more inclined to free-ride on others, it 
is crucially important to have, besides a single central bank with regional banking supervisory 
authority, a regional fiscal body to maintain fiscal discipline and handle fiscal transfers to needy 
member states. 
Therefore,  if  the  CEMAC  monetary  union  must  avoid  the  mistakes  of  the  European 
Monetary Union, fiscal centralization must also be on top of the monetary integration agenda. 
This analysis suggests that, like in the experience of the eurozone, monetary union in CEMAC 
would be problematic without fiscal centralization or a political union. 
 
4. Summary and Policy Recommendations for CEMAC Countries 
  
The analysis has identified oil resource depletion in the somewhat near future as one of the 
greatest risks to the sustainability of the current CBA linking the CEMAC CFA franc to the euro. 
Also,  the  stagnating  growth  performance  in  CEMAC’s  non-oil  GDP  coupled  with  continuing 
volatility in global financial markets poses additional threats to the fixed exchange regime. This 
means that CEMAC policymakers must begin considering possible exit options from the current 
CBA. 
 
The analysis in this study suggests the following: 
 
1.  A  multilateral  framework  for  the  conduct  of  monetary  policy  remains  the  ideal  option  for 
CEMAC Countries, as this framework constrains the discretion of national monetary authorities 
contributing  to  price  stability.  Therefore,  and  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  CEMAC  states  do  not 
currently  meet  economic  convergence  criteria  for  forming  an  optimum  currency  area,  a 
monetary union remains the first-best exit option from the current monetary arrangement. 
 
2. Given a monetary union framework, two exchange rate regime options open for the CEMAC 
common currency, either a pegging regime or a managed floating exchange regime. A pegging 
regime can take one of the three forms: pegging against a single currency such as the euro or 
dollar, pegging to a basket of currencies (such as the special drawing rights, or to a combination 
of the euro, renminbi and dollar); or pegging to the export price of oil, (Khan, 2009). Further 
research beyond the scope of the present paper should unravel the mechanics surrounding 
each  of  these  options.  At  this  stage  of  CEMAC  states’  economic  development,  given  their 
structural characteristics, and in light of current developments in the eurozone, a dollar peg for 
the single CEMAC franc would be a realistic option. Two considerations would justify a dollar 
peg  for  the  single  CEMAC  franc  going  forward.  Since  the  main  problem  facing  the  current 
regime  is  the  anticipated  depletion  of  reserves  from  oil  revenues,  there  is  need  for  other 
instruments, besides reserve buffers, for effectively defending the fixed exchange regime. The 
only  instrument  for  defending  a  fixed  exchange  regime  without  recourse  to  reserves  is 
intervention in forward and derivative markets. Yet this option is currently unavailable to CEMAC 
economies due to the under-developed nature of their capital markets. A dollar peg - by allowing  
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CEMAC zone countries access to U.S. capital market instruments - would ensure stability of the 
single CEMAC francs in the event of the depletion of oil resource and foreign reserves. A dollar 
peg would also be justified on grounds that it ensures stability of income flows from abroad, 
considering that almost all CEMAC exports are denominated in U.S. dollars and access to U.S. 
financial instruments through the dollar peg might be instrumental in hedging against dollar-
related exchange rate risks. On the contrary, a euro peg that allows access to eurozone but not 
U.S. financial instruments would be ineffective at enabling investors hedge against exchange 
rate risks associated  with  volatility  in  the  dollar.  However, as (Khan,  2009) has argued, the 
choice of exchange rate regime need not be a permanent decision: Countries generally switch 
from one regime to another depending on both the desired degree of flexibility in monetary 
policy and on the level of development of monetary institutions. Thus, as further intra-regional 
as well as extra-regional trade, services and asset markets integration occurs, requiring greater 
exchange rate flexibility, and as institutional reforms deepen, CEMAC states can proceed from a 
dollar peg to a basket peg and eventually to a managed floating regime. 
Implementing a full monetary union with a dollar peg of the CEMAC franc necessitates 
putting  in  place  the  institutional  mechanisms  that  would  render  the  Bank  of  Central  African 
States (BEAC) functional as a truly independent central bank. This move is important because 
CEMAC’s inflation would have to be brought down to and maintained at the extraordinarily low 
rate as in the U.S. While the framework for joint conduct of monetary policy, including rules for 
sharing  seigniorage  revenues  and  pooling  reserves  may  easily  be  established  following  the 
pattern in the current CBA, CEMAC countries would need to invest in institution building and 
human  capital  to  develop  their  capacity  to  deal  with  new  challenges  resulting  from  greater 
exposure  of  their  economies  to  the  world  economy.  In  addition,  more  efforts  towards 
modernizing  their  financial  sector,  notably  with  the  introduction  of  financial  instruments  that 
hedge  against  fluctuations  in  commodity  prices  and  revenues,  would  help  smooth  potential 
adverse asymmetric shocks to CEMAC economies. 
Considering that CEMAC states do not currently possess the institutional structures and 
the human capital resources necessary to implement a monetary union with a dollar peg, their 
short-term goal should be to improve the current functioning of the CBA, while progressively 
putting in place the framework to support the new regime. As such, efforts at anchoring their 
fiscal  policies  in  sustainable  medium-term  frameworks  must  be  maintained  along  with  the 
pursuit of structural policies to improve competitiveness and the business climate in CEMAC 
states. Further efforts should be geared at increasing real wage flexibility—introducing variable 
pay elements and possibly changes in bargaining set-ups—and operationalizing the common 
regional bond market. 
The  experience  of  East  Caribbean  countries  that  also  operate  a  currency  board 
suggests  that  CEMAC  countries  can  further  ameliorate  the  performance  of  the  CBA  by 
engaging  in  functional  cooperation  to  provide  services,  infrastructure  and  institutional 
arrangements that facilitate both intra-regional and extra-regional trade. This engagement would 
lead to the progressive dismantling of the numerous non-tariff barriers to intra-regional trade in 
CEMAC. Luckily, these initiatives are consistent with the medium-term plan of a full monetary 
union. 
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